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Guess Who's Coming to the
Bargaining Table?
LEE MODJESKA*
Some years ago Professor Archibald Cox observed that "the law has
crossed the threshold into the conference room and now looks over the
negotiator's shoulder," and Professor Cox queried whether or not "the
next step [is] to take a seat at the bargaining table?"'  The direction
recently taken by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), both
General Counsel2 and Board, makes the question more pertinent and
prophetic than ever. The position taken by the NLRB in several recent
cases raises fundamental questions concerning the government's role in
private collective bargaining negotiations. Governmental overregulation
of the process, substance, and content of labor negotiations has hitherto
been regarded by Congress and the courts as the antithesis of collective
bargaining in a free society. The appropriate governmental role has been
viewed essentially as referee in the socioeconomic struggle of bargaining
negotiations. The specific decisions made in these recent cases, as well as
the philosophic radiations from those decisions, suggest the potentiality
for a sharp departure from a tolerant or permissive governmental role.
This article neither collates nor harmonizes the precedents but simply
raises a narrow yet hopefully significant question concerning a possible
shift in national labor policy.
I. GOVERNMENTAL OVERREGULATION OF THE
BARGAINING MECHANICS
Governmental overregulation of the procedural mechanics of bar-
gaining negotiations is reflected in recent decisions by the General Counsel
and the Board holding that the stenographic transcription or electronic
recording of bargaining negotiations is not a mandatory subject of
* Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law.
1. Cox, The Duty To Bargain In Good Faith, 71 HA Rv. L.R Ev. 1401, 1403 (1958).
2. Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970) ).gives
the Board or its agent broad discretionary authority concerning the issuance of unfair labor practice
complaints. NLRB v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 9, 18 (1943). Section 3(d) (29 U.S.C. §
153(d) (1970)) confers this power upon the General Counsel of the Board, and provides that he shall
have "final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance ot
complaints under section 10, and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the
Board . . . ." SeeNLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &Co.,421 U.S. 132(1975);Saezv. Gosleeo463 F.2d214
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972), and cases there cited. The General Counsel plays a major
role not only in the enforcement but also in the formulation and development of national labor policy,
and his decisions are thus highly relevant to any meaningful analysis of NLRA doctrine. Further.the
General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint is in fact an adjudication of unfair labor practice
claims. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 141,148 (1975). Recent Freedom of Informa-
tion Act litigation such as Sears has properly resulted in the increased visibility of General Counsel
decisions.
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bargaining. In one case3 the General Counsel found that the employer
violated section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Acte (the Act) by
insisting to the point of impasse that a stenographic reporter be present at
contract bargaining negotiations to take verbatim transcriptions of negoti-
ations with no "off-the-record" discussion allowed. The General Counsel
authorized issuance of the complaint upon a per se theory, namely, that the
employer's insistence upon the reporter was in and of itself a refusal to
bargain in good faith. In the General Counsel's view, the presence of a
stenographer would preclude open and free discussion and would breed
distrust between the parties. Further, if bargaining unit employees were
to see a verbatim transcript and thus learn the content of frank discussions
between the employer and the union, hostilities could thereby be created
between the employees and the union. The Geneial Counsel reasoned as
follows:
Expert opinion in the field of labor relations is nearly unanimous in
condemning the practice of recording bargaining sessions. . . . According
to [one] study . . . if they are to be free to communicate the parties in
collective bargaining negotiations need to know that what they say will not be
turned against them. Imposing a stenographer upon a negotiator who
objects to the presence of a stenographer may raise suspicions as to the
ultimate use for which the transcript is to be put and, thereby. inject into the
bargaining relationship an added basis for mistrust and contention ...
For example, a union which recognizes that employee work practices are
deficient might be reticent to discuss this problem frankly in bargaining if
negotiations were recorded, for fear that the employer would seek to
capitalize on the hostility that would be engendered between the employees
and the union's representatives when the employees read the transcribed
remarks of the representatives. Experts have also pointed out that the use of
verbatim transcripts tends to make the parties to negotiations "talk for the
record" rather than for the purpose of advancing negotiations toward
settlement ...
While generally disapproving of the use of stenographers during negotia-
tions, experts have noted that the inhibiting effect of such a procedure may be
3. NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1978] 98 LAB. RuL. Rt,. (BNA) 61. 62,
4. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970)) makes it an unlair labor practice lor an
employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his cmployecs .... " Section
8(b)(3) (29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1970)) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union "to reltise to bargain
collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subiect to tle
provisions of [section 9(a)]." Section 8(b)(3) essentially represents the counterpart of the employer'.
duty to bargain in good faith under § 8(a)(5). Seegetneralh NIRB v. Insurance Ageuts' Int'l t)ion,
361 U.S. 477 (1960). Section 8(d) of the Act (29 U.S.C, § 158(d) (St pp, V 1975)) deline% the dutv to
bargain collectively to include "the performance of the mutual obligation ol the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good laith with respcct to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment .... " Subjccts %wthin the - 8(d)
defirition of "wages. hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" are regarded as
man latorv subjects of bargaining about which an employer and union mut bargain and upon which
eithe party may insist to the point of impassse. See NIRB v. Wooster liv, ol Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U.S.342(1958). See alio M alonev. White Motor Corp.. 98 S. Ct. I 185 (1978). Fibreboard Raper
Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964): Local 24. Teamsters v. Oliver. 358 U'S, 283 (1959), If the
matter involves a permissive rather than a mandatory subiect o1 bargaining the parties are not
obligated to bargain about the matter. See Chemical Workers iLocal I v. Pittsburgh Plhte ilws Co.,
404 U.S. 157, 183 88(1971).
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lessened to some extent by a liberal policy of going "off the record." . . .
However, the Employer in the case under discussion had taken the position
that nothing said during negotiations would be "off the record."s
One would have thought that the General Counsel's decision was
foreclosed by Board precedent. While the Board had indicated its general
disapproval of stenographic transcriptions of bargaining negotiations, it
had not held that insistence on a transcription was per se unlawful.6
Rather, the Board had treated the issue of stenographic transcriptions as a
mandatory subject of bargaining upon which either party could insist to
the point of impasse, provided the insistence was made in good faith."
While individual Board members had occasionally disagreed with the
Board's approach, 8 there had been no conflict of decisions or uncertainty
of precedent. The General Counsel was therefore not presented with a
situation in which he was obligated to present the issue to the Board for
clarification. It must be conceded, however, that the General Counsel
anticipated correctly the fickleness of the Board.
5. NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1978] 98 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 61, 63-64.
6. In Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850,854 (195 ), enforced, 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.),cert.
denied. 346 U.S. 887 (1953), noted by the General Counsel in the above case, the Board stated:
This is not the approach usually taken by a participant in collectie bargaining negotiations
seeking and expecting in good faith to reach an agreement: it is more consistent with the
building of a defense to anticipated refusal to bargain charges. The presence of a steno-
grapher at such negotiations is not conducive to the friendly atmosphere so necessary for the
successful termination of the negotiations, and it is a practice condemned by experienced
persons in the industrial relations field. Indeed. the business world itself frowns upon the
practice in any delicate negotiations where it is so necessary for the parties to express
themselh es freely.
While enforcing the Board's overall finding of bad faith bargaining in Reed & Prince, the First Circuit
stated. "[W]e are not inclined to agree with the Board that the Company's insistence. over the Union's
strenuous objection, on having a stenotypist present at all the bargaining meetings to take down a
verbatim transcript of the proceedings was evidence of the Company's bad faith." 205 F.2d at 139.
Thereafter. in St. Louis Typographical Union No. 8 (Graphic Arts Ass'n of St. Louis. Inc.). 149
N.L.R.B. 750, 751-52 (1964) (footnotes omitted), the Board stated:
[Tihe Board's language in Reed & Prince regarding the effect of the presence ofa stenographer
must be read in the context of other evidence of bad faith which %%as present in that case. In
subsequent decisions, the legality of insisting upon a stenographic transcript at bargaining
sessions has been determined in the light of the entire bargainingcontext rather than on aper
.se basis. Similarly. in cases dealing with charges of a refusal to bargain arising from an
adamant insistence on other conditions preliminary to actual bargaining, such as the
determination of the time or place of bargaining. the Board has av oided establishing rigid
standards favoring any particular proposal, but has. rather, attempted to examine each case
in terms of, whether or not the positions were taken to avoid or frustrate the legal obligation to
bargain.
. . . [lit is clear that respected authorities differ in their opinion ofthe effect ofmakinga
stenographic transcript in collective-bargaining sessions. It is not our intention here either to
endorse or condemn the practice of utilizing a stenographer during bargaining negotiations.
Rather. in this matter we shall undertake to determine only whether. in assuming its
position. the Respondent acted in a manner consistent with the principles of good-faith
bargaining required by the Act.
7. Eg.. Architectural Fiberglass. 165 N.L.R.B. 238. 239 n.8 (1967). and cases cited therein:
Southern Transp.. Inc.. 150 N.L.R.B. 305, 311 (1964) (Browsn. Member. concurring). entarwn'nt
denied. 355 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1966): St. Louis Typographical Union No. 8 (Graphic Arts AVn atSt.
Louis. Inc.). 149 N.I..R.B. 750.753 (1964) (Fanning & Brown. Members. concurring), and cacs cited
therein.
8. See cases cited at note 7 supra.
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In Bartlett-Collins Co.,9 the full Board agreed with the General
Counsel 0 that insistence to impasse upon a court reporter to record
bargaining sessions is a per se violation of the Act. The Board said that the
issue is not a mandatory subject of bargaining, that "it is irrelevant whether
[the employer's] insistence was in good or bad faith,"" and that prior
Board decisions to the contrary are overruled. The Board thus appears to
have taken literally and with dispatch the Supreme Court's recent state-
ment in NLRB v. Local 103, Iron Workers, 2 that the Board "is not
disqualified from changing its mind. ,, 3 The serious and longstand-
ing problem of the Board's frequent disregard and overruling of prior
decisions is beyond the scope of this article. The problem is of major
importance, however, and deserves critical analysis. One is reminded of
Justice Robert's observation that the tendency "freely to disregard and to
overrule considered decisions and the rules of law announced in
them . .. tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class
as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only."'14
In Bartlett- Collins, the parties negotiated unsuccessfully for several
months for a first contract. The Board found, in an'earlier decision, 5 that
by making proposals during this period that it knew the union could not
accept, the employer had engaged in bad faith bargaining designed to
undermine the union's representative status. The Board found that the
employer thereby violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Thereafter,
the parties agreed to resume bargaining. Prior to the first scheduled
meeting the employer advised the union that it was making arrangements
for a court reporter to record the forthcoming negotiations. The employ-
er believed that the prior Board decision had turned upon credibility
resolutions and that a certified court reporter's transcript of negotiations
would eliminate misunderstanding or misquoting.16 The union opposed
the presence of a court reporter and suggested that each party record the
sessions with its own electronic equipment. 7 The employer rejected the
union's alternative proposal and continued to insist upon a court reporter's
transcription. The scheduled negotiations were eventually cancelled.
9. 237 N.L.R.B. No. 106,99 L.R.R.M. 1034 (1978).
10. The names of the parties do not appear in the General Counsc I reports, and it is therefore not
clear whether or not the Board and General Counsel cases were in fact fhe same case,
It. 237 N.L.R.B. No. 106.99 L.R.R.M. at 1036.
12. 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
13. Id. at 351.
14. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,666,669 (1944) (Roberts, J . dissenting),
15. Bartlett-Collins Co.. 230 N.L.R.B. No. 18.96 L.R.R.M. 1581 (1977),
16. The employer told the union that "a record of bargaining wder the circumstances is both
desirable and necessary to establish without resort to credibility determinations wshat swas said or done
by the parties in bargaining." 237 N.L.R.B. No. 106.99 L.R.R.M, at 1035,
17. The union advised the employer that the presence of a court reporter would interlere with
negotiations and frank discussion, and that the bargaining committee would be reluctant to state their
views because of their unfamiliarity with judicial or administrative proceedings when stenographic
transcripts are made by court reporters. M.
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The Board found that the employer's insistence to impasse upon a
court reporter's presence as a precondition to negotiations was a per se
violation of section 8(a) (5) and (I) "without regard to whether such
insistence was in good or bad faith."' 8 The Board found that the issue of a
court reporter, or alternatively of a recording device, is not a mandatory
subject of bargaining because it relates to a "threshold" rather than a
"substantive" matter in negotiations. t9 The Board found that labor
relations experts believe that the presence of a court reporter interferes
with the free and open discussion necessary for successful negotiations.
The Board stated that:
The question of whether a court reporter should be present during negotia-
tions is a threshold matter, preliminary and subordinate to substantive
negotiations such as are encompassed within the phrase "wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment." As it is our statutory responsi-
bility to foster and encourage meaningful collective bargaining, we believe
that we would be avoiding that responsibility were we to permit a party to
stifle negotiations in their inception over such a threshold issue. 0
There is little to commend the General Counsel's and the Board's
pursuance of a per se doctrine in this area. Determinations of good or bad
faith bargaining based upon per se categorizations of bargaining subjects
or tactics have not generally been favored by the Supreme Court.2' The
preferable approach entails an analysis of whether or not the totality of a
party's conduct manifests bad faith.22  There are of course exceptional
situations where findings of overall subjective bad faith are not required.
Thus, if the conduct is in essence an outright refusal to bargain or a direct
obstruction to bargaining or a clear indication of no intention to reach
agreement then no such overall evaluation is necessary. 3 The desire of a
negotiating party for a transcription of negotiations hardly seems to be so
clearly flagrant a situation that itjustifies dispensing with an overall good
or bad faith analysis.
2 4
The General Counsel and the Board rest their position in large
measure upon the proposition that labor relations experts generally
18. 237 N.L.R.B. No. 106.99 L.R.R.M. at 1036.
19. Id. The Board said that the issue does not fall within the § 8(d) categories of"wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment" that are mandatory subjects of bargaining. See note
4 supra. Rather, said the Board. the issue is a permissive or nonmandatory subject upon '. hich the
parties may lawfully bargain but not insist to impasse.
20. 237 N.L.R.B. No. 106. 99 L.R.R.M. at 1036.
21. Eg.. NLRBv. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union. 361 U.S. 477(1960): NLRB %.American Xat'l
Ins. Co.. 343 U.S. 395 (1952). Cf. American Ship Bldg. Co.'.. NLRB. 380 U.S. 300 (1965) (lockout in
support of bargaining position). See alo H.K. Porter Co. %. NLRB. 397 U.S. 99. 109 (1970),
22. -Each case must turn upon its particular facts. The inquiry must al%%a. s be %%hether or not
under the circumstances of the particular case the statutory obligation to bargain in good faith ha' been
met.- NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co.. 351 U.S. 149. 153 54 (1956). See NLRB %. American Nat'l Ins. Co..
343 U.S. 395, 409-10 (1952).
23. NLRB %. Kat7. 369 U.S. 736, 742 43.747 (1962).
24. Comparative note may be taken of the follo%%ing observation made by Professor Cox in the
context of an analysis of NLRB v. Truitt M fg. Co.. 351 U.S. 149 (1956):
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condemn the practice of negotiation transcriptions, This appears to be a
gross oversimplification of a complex question. The implication of a
negotiators' consensus seems most questionable, for experienced negotia-
tors in fact disagree concerning the desirability, utility, and validity of
transcribing negotiations. The Board itself had previously recognized
that "it is clear that respected authorities differ in their opinion of the effect
of making a stenographic transcript in collective-bargaining sessions.""
Professor Gorman has noted:
Labor relations experts have differing opinions as to the propriety of
verbatim recording of bargaining sessions, with the proponents asserting that
it aids in drafting the contract and in resolving subsequent disputes which
turn upon the course of negotiation, and the opponents asserting that it
encourages artificially "making a record" rather than candid and conciliatory
give and take.
2 6
It is the personal experience of this writer that in real life there can be and
are a variety of reasons, not at all inconsistent with good faith bargaining,
for desiring a transcription of negotiations.
Areas of frequent controversy can be efficiently and accurately
resolved with the availability of a verbatim record of what was said and
done during negotiations. The transcription can not only be indispensable
to the Board and reviewing courts, as well as labor arbitrators, in the
performance of their functions, but, depending upon the particular
situation, can be invaluable to one or both of the parties. For example,
the Board is routinely required to review and analyze negotiations in detail
to determine whether or not the parties reached final agreement, 2 or
agreed upon a specific provision, or insisted upon an illegal condition,"
or waived the right to bargain about a particular subject, or engaged in an
Activities which originally were regarded as some evidence ol a fact carrying legal
consequences- in this case bad faith in a truly subjective sense olten come to he sullicient
proof standing alone, thus giving rise to new rules of conduct. The process had taken place.
albeit for stronger reasons, in dealing with a refusal to sign a written contract, unilateral
action, and withholding wage data. But although this is a xxay in % hich lax grox s. use ol the
technique ought to depend upon a conscious examination of the underlying quetitns ol
policy.
Cox. supra note I. at 1433-34.
25. St. Louis Typographical Union No. 8 (Graphic Arts Ass'n otSt. ouis, Inc.), 149 N I I.,
750,752(1964).
26. R. GORMAN Bsi( TEXT oN LiioR LAW UNIo\IS % T%%D CoI I( tI1 1 10Ri\I'%(. 416
(1976). See F. ELKOt-Rl & E. ELK0otRi. How ARBITRATION WORKs 313 (3d ed, 1973),
27. See. e.g.. NLRBv. Painters Local 1385. 334 F.2d 729.731 (7th Cir 1964),
28. See, e.g., C & W Lektra Bat Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 1038 (1974). enlorced, 513 F.2d 200 (6th Cir.
1975): NLRB v. Painters Local 1385.334 F.2d 729(7th Cir. 1964).
29. See. e.g., NLRB v. Davison. 318 F.2d 550 (4th Cir. 1963).
30. See The Bunker Hill Co.. 208 N.L.R.B, 27 (1973). mnodthied. 211 N I R.B, 343 (1974L;
Radioear Corp.. 199 N.L.R.B. 1161 (1972): New York Mirror. 151 NAL,IB. 834 (1965). I ucker Steel
Corp.. 134 N.L.R.B. 323 (1961): Proctor Mfg. Corp.. 131 N.I,,R,B, 1166(1961); - he Press Co, 121
N.L.R.B. 976 (1958): Speidel Corp.. 120 N.L.R.B. 733 (1958): Jacob, MIg Co,. 94 N.I RI,. 1214
(1951). enforced. 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).
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overall course of bad faith bargaining conduct,' or reached an impasse. "
In addition, during the life of the labor contract a myriad of questions arise
daily that require interpretation of particular contractual language and
that frequently turn upon or require an analysis of bargaining history
and the content of negotiations.3 3  The Elkouris have observed that:
Precontract negotiations frequently provide a valuable aid in the interpreta-
tion of ambiguous provisions. Where the meaning of a term is not clear, it
will be deemed, if there is no evidence to the contrary, that the parties
intended it to have the same meaning as that given it during the negotiations
leading up to the agreement. In such case, consideration will be given to all of
the circumstances leading up to the making of the contract.
The arbitrator must place himself, to the extent possible, in the situation
of the parties at the time of the negotiations so as to view the circumstances as
the parties viewed them and to judge the meaning of the agreement according-
ly. In this regard, the arbitrator might make a special request for complete
detail as to bargaining history. Recordings and ntinutes of bargaining
meetihgsproxidei hportantev'idence, and in one case a union's "Negotiations
Bulletin" was found to provide a "useful clue" in reference to bargaining
history. Even where no stenographic record is kept and no notes are taken,
the history of negotiations may be relied upon by the arbitrator if he is
satisfied as to the accuracy of the oral testimony of persons who attended the
negotiations. 4
The ascertainment of the intention of the parties and the reasoned
effectuation and enforcement of contractual obligations3 5 are rather
31. See NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969). cert. denied. 397 U.S. 965.
rehearing denied. 397 U.S. 990 (1970): White v. NLRB. 255 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1958) Lloyd A. Fr
Roofing Co. v. NLRB. 216 F.2d 273(9th Cir. 1954). amended. 220 F.2d 432(9th Cir. 1955); NL RB %
Reed & Prince Co.. 205 F.2d 131 (Ist Cir.). cert. denied. 346 U.S. 887(1953); United Engines. Inc.. 222
N.L.R.B. 50 (1976): Architectural Fiberglass, 165 N.L.R.B. 238 (1967): KohlerCo. 128 VI .R.B 1062
(1960). enforced in part. modiffied and remanded in par!. 300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir.). et. dhnwtl. 3X2
U.S. 836(1962).
32. See. e.g.. Fever Television v. NLRB. 317 F.2d 420 (6th Cir. 1963): XLRB %. Intracoastal
Terminal. Inc.. 286 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1961); Atlas Tack Corp.. 226 N.L.R.B. 222 (1976). lilt
Broadcasting Co.. 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967). enforced. 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See t:etcralh
Schatzki. The Enuployer's Unilateral Act-A PerSe Violation- Sometirnes.44 Tf \ L. Rts470.495
(1966).
33. See. e.g.. NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp.. 385 U.S. 421.423.424 n. 6(1967): California EeCC
Powser Co.. 21 Lab. Arb. 704. 706 (Grant, 1953): North Am. Aiation. Inc.. 19 Lab, rb 138. 143
(Komaroff. 1952): Columbia Steel Co.. 7 Lab. Arb. 512. 514 (Blumer. 1947): G. C, Hlusse% & Co. 5
Lab. Arb. 446.448 (Blair. 1946). See also Detroit Edison Co.. 43 Lab. Arb. 193.200-10 (i, Smith.
1964): Sidney Wanier & Sons. 46 Lab. Arb. 426. 428-29 (Dolnick. 1966): 1 os Nngeles Herald
Examiner. 45 Lab. Arb. 860,862 (Kadish. 1965): Lehigh Portland Cement Co,.42 lab, 'rb, 458.465
(Hebert. 1964): Kohlenberger Enir Corp.. 12 Lab. Arb. 380.384 ( Praso%%. 1949): Borden's -arm Prod
Inc.. 3 L.ab. Arb. 401. 402-03 (Burke. 1945). It should be noted that statements ol mediator. ma% he
held to be inadmissible privileged communications. Day Care Council. 55 Lab, Arb. 113t0. il35
(Glushien. 1970): Air Reduction Chem. & Carbide Co.. 41 Lab. Arb. 24.26 (Warns. 1903).
34. F. ELKOtRI & E. ELKot'RI. supra note 26. at 313 (emphasis added).
35. Note should be taken of the following comments of Dean Harry Shulman,
The parties recogniie. when they make their collectihe agreement. that the% ma% not
ha, e anticipated everything and that. in any e ent. there ss ill be man% differences ot opinion
as to the proper application of its standards. Accordingly the agreement establtshe a
griexance procedure or machinery for the adjustment of complaints or disputes during its
term. The autonomous rule of law thus established contemplates that the disputes will be
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fundamental in our jurisprudential scheme: there seems little of substance
to justify the NLRB's negative approach to this valuable record of the
parties' understandings and intentions. Indeed. Arbitrator James Burke
lamented in one case that "[a]s to the history of this [contract] section
during the original contract negotiations, it is unfortunate that no steno-
graphic record was kept . . *,36 Intent is one prime but elusive factor in
contract analysis and interpretation, and in divining that intent one needs
all the help one can muster. If that intent can be found in the record of a
particular negotiation, then its revelation should be fostered, not discour-
aged.
The General Counsel's concern that union-employee relations might
suffer were bargaining unit employees to learn the truth about what their
bargaining agent says at negotiations is hardly laudable. Under the Acta
union as exclusive bargaining representative has a duty to represent all
employees in the unit fairly, both in collective bargaining with the
employer and in its enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement.
A union breaches that duty when it acts against a unit employee for
arbitrary or discriminatory reasons, or in bad faith."5 In the Board's view
the union's duty of fair representation represents an affirmative fiduciary
responsibility,39 which includes an obligation of full disclosure.40 Fur-
adjusted by the application of reason guided by the light of the contract, rather than bv orce
or power.
Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Lair in Labor Relations. 68 H %i'v, L RLv. 999. 1107 (1955),
36. Borden's Farm Prods., Inc., 3 Lab. Arb. 401, 402 (1945). See St. Louis Typographical
Union No. 8 (Graphic Arts Ass'n of St. Louis, Inc.), 149 N.L.R.B. 750, 757-59 (1964) (analysis by
Trial Examiner Frederick U. Reel).
37. Vaca v. Sipes. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). Steele v. Louisville & Nasl'v iilk RR,. 323 UXS. 192 (1944)h
Miranda Fuel Co.. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied. 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Se
generallr Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Thieoretihal Structure. I I I \ % I . RI %I 11)
(1973): Cox. The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REv. 15 1 (1057); M odjeska, The u(ertain
Miranda Fuel Doctrine. 38 011o ST. L.J. 807 (1977).
38. In Vaca v. Sipes. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). the Court defined tle duty as Iollos: "tInder this
doctrine, the exclusive agent's statutory authority to represent all member, ol a designated unit
includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility ordverinmnation
towsard any. to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitray
conduct." Id. at 177. A breach of the statutory duty of fair representation wa,,said to occtir "only %, hen
a union's conduct toward a member of th6 collective bargaining unit is Arbitrary. discriminatorv, or in
bad faith." i. at 190. In Miranda Fuel Co.. 140 N.L.R.B. 181. 185 (1962). enlor(ewnt d nied. 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), the Board stated that § 7 of the Act "gives employees the right to be Irece ror
unfair or irrelevant or invidious treatment by their exclusive bargaining agent in matters allctting their
employment" and that § 8(b)( I )(A) of the Act "accordingly prohibits la;ior organiiations. ns hen acting
in a statutory representative capacity, from takingaction against any employee upon con iderations or
classifications which are irrelevant, invidious, or unfair."
39. E.g.. General Truck Drivers Local 315 (Rhodes& Jamieson, LItd.. 217 N.I ,R.B. 61601 975),
enforced. 545 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1976). See aho Phyllis Whitehead, 224 N.1 R.IL 244 (1976).
40. DemerStereotypers Local 13(Denver Post. lnc.).231 N.I ,R.lI. No. 91.Q61 R It M. 1017.
(1977): United Steelworkers (Du%al Corp.). 226 N.L.R.B. 772 (1976); L ocal 324, Operating I m,,'r
(Associated Gen. Contractors). 226 N.I..R.B. 587 (1976): International Bhd. ol I canusters I ocil (71
(Airborne Freight Corp.). 199 N.L.R.B. 994. 999-1000 (1972); NLRB v, Local 182, Int'l Bhd, ol
Teamsters. 401 F.2d 509. 510 (2d Cir. 1968). cert. denied. 394 U.S. 213 ( 969), enlor ,n , 156 \ I R. II
335 (1965). 169 N.IL.R.B. 1143 (1968): NLRB v. Hotel Employees' Lozal 568 (Sheraton Corp.), 120
F.2d 254.258 (3d Cir. 1963): IUE Local 801 v. NLRB. 307 F.2d 679 (D.C. C'ir.). aert i dnicdi, 371 1.S.
936(1962).enforcing, 129 N.L.R.B. 1379(1961),anended, 130N.L.R.B. 1286(1961), ScaIs NLRI
Gen. Counsel Q. Rep.. [1975] LAB. REL. YEARBOOK (BNA) 261.
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thermore, the Board has held that a union's deliberate concealment of
material facts is clearly inconsistent with the duty of fair representation.
41
The General Counsel's position against full disclosure of contract
negotiations appears to be flatly inconsistent with the more stringent
requirements of the developing duty of fair representation.
The General Counsel apparently regarded the employer's insistence
on a stenographic transcription as especially improper because the propos-
al seemingly prohibited "off-the-record" remarks. In litigation practice,
however, it is not uncommon forjudges, hearing officers, or arbitrators to
refuse to depart from the record at any time and to insist that all statements
made during the course of the proceedings be transcribed on the record.
At any rate, if a party has incriminating or sensitive statements to make,
legitimately or qtherwise, it would seem that the ingenuity of parties and
counsel will find nonrecordable channels of communication for such
statements.
The foregoing factors reflect that a transcription of the bargaining
negotiations is inextricably interwoven with the very contract itself. The
transcription becomes an integral part of the interpretation, application.
and enforcement of the contract and is thus clearly related to wages, hours,
and other employment conditions within the meaning of section 8(d). It
can hardly be dismissed as involving a mere "threshold" matter, whatever
that means.
The NLRB would thus appear to be shifting toward the application of
a heavy regulatory hand to the mechanics of the bargaining process. The
intrusion is unwarranted and presupposes that there is commonality to all
negotiations as well as a right and wrong way to bargain. Experienced
negotiators know better. This heavy hand may be contrasted with the
lighter permissive touch applied to bargaining mechanics by the Board
only a few months earlier. Thus, in Axelson, hC.4 2 the Board held that the
employer violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to pay
employee members of the union negotiating committee for time spent in
contract negotiations, and by refusing to bargain about the matter with the
union. For years the union and the employer had been parties to
successive contracts covering the production and maintenance employees,
and the union was represented in contract negotiations by a shop
committee composed of bargaining unit employees. During past negotia-
tions the employer had paid the shop committee members their regular
hourly wages for time lost from production and spent in bargaining
sessions.4 1 In January 1976, during the life of the 1974-1976 contract, the
41. Pacific Intermountain Express Co.. 215 N.L.R.B. 588. 598 (1974). See Warehouse Union
Local 860 (The Emporium), 236 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 98 L.R.R.M. 1421 (1978).
42. 234 N.I..R.B. No.49.97 L.R.R.M. 1234(1978).
43. The employer paid shop committee members for the 1963. 1965. 1967.1971. 1973 midterm.
and 1974 contract negotiations. The record did not disclose whether or not the negottators %'erepaid
in 1969. AL n.l. 97 L.R.R.M. at 1234 n.l.
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parties began negotiations for the 1976-1978 contract. Early in negotia-
tions the employer advised the shop committee members that they would
not be paid for production wages lost during negotiations.44 The employ-
er also advised the committee that it was willing to negotiate during
nonwork time so that committee members would not lose production
wages. The union shop committee protested that the employer's action
was contrary to the contracte5 and past practice, but the employer refused
to bargain about the matter.
The Board found that remuneration of bargaining committee em-
ployees vitally affected the relations between the employer and its em-
ployees and was therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining.4  The
Board found that "[s]uch a matter concerns the relations between an
employer and its employees in that it is related to the representation of the
members of the bargaining unit in negotiations with an employer over
terms and conditions of employment., 47  The Board further found that
44. Three of the four shop committee members were on the day shift and one was on the night
shift. The dispute over negotiation pay for production time lost arose when the committee requested
that the night shift member be reassigned to the day shift in order to receive production pay fbr
negotiating time. The employee had previously accommodated a second-shift negotiator by reassign-
ing him to the first shift during negotiations. Id., 97 L.R.R.M. at 1234.
45. The contract provided in part as follows:
6.4 A shop committeeman will, after notice and permission from his immediate
supervisor, be allowed to leave his work, if necessary for the followin, reasons:
(D) To attend negotiation sessions with Company representatives for the purpose of
renewing this agreement.
6.5 If it becomes necessary fora . . . committeeman to leave his work, after receiving
permission from his immediate supervisor in accordance with Section . . . (1.4 of this
article, he must clock-out on his job card and, on his return, clock-in on his job card.
(B) The . . . shop committeeman will receive pay for time so spent when authorited
by his supervisor prior to, during, and after normal working hours at his regular straight time
hourly rate except on scheduled overtime.
Id., 97 L.R.R.M. at 1234-35.
46. The Board noted its decision in Operating Eng'rs Local 12 (AGC ofAm., Inc.). 187 N,l,.Il1,
430,432 (1970) where it defined mandatory subjects of bargaining as
those comprised in the phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions ofemployment"
as set forth in Section 8(d) of the Act. While the language is broad, parameters have been
established, although not quantified. The touchstone is whether or not the proposed clause
sets a term or condition of employment or regulates the relation between the employer and its
employees.
The Board rejected the finding of the Administrative Law Judge that the remuneration issue went morc
to union-employer relations than to employee-employer relations. 234 N.t ,R.B, No. 49,97 L.R.R.M.
at 1235.
47. The Board noted its previous rulings that employee remuneration for time spent in the
analogous union function of presentation of grievances is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Eg.,
American Ship Bldg. Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 788 (1976); Hilton-Davis Chem. (o., 185 N.LR.B. 241.242-
43 (1970); Bethlehem Steel Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1347(1961). supplemental decision, 136 N.L.RB. 1500
(1962). enforcement denied & case remanded, 320 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1963). cert. denied, 375 U.S. 984
(1964), second supplemental decision, 147 N.L.R.B. 977 (1964). The Board stated:
We see no distinction between an employee's involvement in contract negotiations and
involvement in the presentation ofgrievances. In one situation an employee is implementing
a contractual term or condition of employment and in the other situation an employee is
attempting to obtain or improve contractual terms or conditions of -mployment. In both
situations the activity is for the benefit of all of the members of the bargaining unit.
234 N.L.R.B. No. 49,97 L.R.R.M. at 1235.
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payment for negotiating time was not only required by the plain meaning
of the contract but also was an established past practice. Accordingly, the
Board concluded that the employer violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) by
refusing to bargain about the payments and by unilaterally ceasing the
payments.
The Board's decision in Axelson appears to be thoroughly consistent
with the evolving concept of mandatory subjects of bargaining.48 A
matter is within the scope of mandatory bargaining if it directly concerns
or regulates relations between the employer and its employees involving
subjects within the section 8(d) phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment."4 9 Mandatory bargaining includes subjects
within the section 8(d) realm that bear "a close relation to labor's efforts to
improve working conditions," 50 or that "constitute a subject of immediate
and legitimate concern to union members," 51 or that "vitally affect" the
terms and conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees.5 2
These are the relevant analytical questions, not the elusive and essentially
subjective distinctions between so-called "threshold" and "substantive"
issues applied in Bartlett-Collins.
Payment to employees of wages for lost production time spent in
bargaining negotiations is clearly within the literal meaning of the section
8(d) phrase "wages." In an immediate sense the payments are virtually by
definition directly related to the wages and wage structure of the negotiat-
ing committee employees. Further, a preeminent topic of the negotiations
themselves is inevitably the issue of bargaining unit wages. In an ultimate
sense the issue vitally affects the wages, terms, and conditions of all
bargaining unit employees. The payments enable the unit employees
through their selected employee representatives to negotiate their funda-
48. Professor Meltzer has commented that
the NLRB has tended to expand the bargaining duty in response to "new condi-
tions. .. . The "new conditions" to which the law has responded include the progressive
expansion of collective agreements into new areas. That expansion has frequently been
independent of direct legal compulsion and has resulted from changing technology, changes
in the parties' views as to what subjects should be governed by jointly determined rules, and
from the determination of unions to exert economic power to enlarge the area governed by
jointly determined standards. Decisions under the N LRA have both reflected and reinforced
those institutional tendencies, by expanding the areas included in the subjects of mandatory
bargaining.
B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW CASEs, MATERIALS and PROBLEMS 724 (2d ed. 1977). As Professor Kathrn
Sowle observed some years ago, "expansion has been the primary characteristic of the scope of
mandatory bargaining .... " Comment, The Duty to Bargain: Bargainable Issues. 50 Nw. U.L.
REV. 279, 283 (1955).
49. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342(1958).
50. Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283.294(1959). See Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). Cf. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100.421 U.S.
616(1975). See also American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
51. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 692 (1965). See
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664 (1965).
52. Chemical Workers Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 179 (1971).
Section 8(d) of the Act, of course, does not immutably fix a list of subjects for mandatory
bargaining . . . . But it does establish a limitation against which proposed topics must be
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mental contract without financial penalty or hardship. The matter thus
goes to the very essence of the relationship between the employees and
their employer.
The conclusion that negotiation payment for lost production time is a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining is "further reinforced by
industrial practices in this country."" As the Supreme Court stated in
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB:
While not determinative, it is appropriate to look to industrial bargaining
practices in appraising the propriety of including a particular subject within
the scope of mandatory bargaining. . . . Industrial experience is not only
reflective of the interests of labor and management in the subject matter but is
also indicative of the amenability of such subjects to the collective bargaining
process.
54
The issue of employee compensation for negotiating time is a common
topic at the bargaining table, and provisions relating to the matter exist in
numerous collective bargaining agreements.
Such questions as whether or not a union will request or an employer
will make payments for negotiating time, and when, are frequently delicate
and complex questions turning upon a myriad of facts and circumstances
in the particular negotiation. Some employers adamantly refuse ever to
make such payments, some employers agree at the outset of negotiations to
make the payments, and some employers prefer to keep the issue open on
the bargaining table as a negotiable item that can sometimes be highly
effective in wrapping up a final agreement. It must never be forgotten in
any analysis concerning the regulation of collective bargaining negotia-
tions that "[t]he pressure for trade or compromise is ever present."5
Moreover, some unions want the employer to pay for negotiating time,
some unions prefer to make the payments out of union funds, and some
unions prefer to leave the employee negotiators unreimbursed. Many
unions recognize that, left open as a negotiable item, the issue is uniquely
suitable for effective use by the employer to divide, manipulate, or
conquer the employee committee. Either or both of the parties may
believe that paid employee negotiators are not conducive to speedy and
efficient negotiations because the employees may learn to prefer the
comforts of the conference room to the rigors of the production line. The
policies, strategies, and politics involved have many variations." What-
measured. In general terms, the limitation includes only issues th't settle an aspect of the
relationship between the employer and employees.
Id. at 178.
53. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB. 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964).
54. Id. See NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395.406-07 (1952).
55. Shulman, supra note 35, at 1004.
56. See generally R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD, & D, ROThSCHILD, COLLECTIVE BAROAININO AND
LABOR ARBITRATION 25-45 (1970), and materials there cited.
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ever the variations, however, it is clear that the subject matter is a familiar
part of the collective bargaining framework, and that the Board quite
properly left resolution of the matter to the parties. So also, absent
independent evidence of bad faith, should resolution of bargaining
transcriptions be left to resolution by the parties.
II. GOVERNMENTAL OVERREGULATION OF THE
BARGAINING CONTENT
Governmental overregulation of the substantive content of bargain-
ing negotiations is reflected in a recent decision by the General Counsel to
issue a complaint alleging that a union's proposed successorship clause was
not a mandatory subject of bargaining.5 8 During negotiations the union
insisted that the following successorship clause be included in the contract:
It is agreed that if the employer sells, assigns, leases or otherwise transfers the
control, operation or assets of its business to another person, company.
corporation or firm, the employer will require such transferee to assume the
obligations of this agreement by specific provision in the agreement to
transfer.5
9
The General Counsel noted that the clause was not specifically limited by
its terms to a situation in which bargaining unit employees survive a
change in ownership. The General Counsel also noted that there was no
evidence establishing that the employer had sold its business in the past
and that bargaining unit employees had survived the sale. Accordingly,
the General Counsel concluded that the clause was not a mandatory
subject of bargaining, and that the union violated section 8(b)(3) of the Act
by insisting upon the clause.
The General Counsel's determination came before the ink had barely
dried on the Board decision in United Mine Workers (Lone Star Steel
Co.).60  In Lone Star the Board held that a virtually identical successor-
ship clause was a mandatory subject of bargaining, and that the union did
not violate section 8(b)(3) by insisting to the point of impasse upon its
acceptance. 61 The successorship clause provided:
In consideration of the Union's execution of this Agreement, each
Employer promises that its operations covered by this Agreement shall not be
57. It should be noted that during the Wagner Act debates on the original § 8(5). now § 8(axS).
Senator Walsh, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, stated:
When the employees have chosen their organization, when they have selected their
representatives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort them to the door of their employer and
say, -Here they are, the legal representatives of your employees." What happens behind
those doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it.
79 CONG. REC. 7660 (1935). See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 104 (1970).
58. NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1978] 98 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA), 61,66.
59. Id.
60. 231 N.L.R.B. No.88,96 L.R.R.M. 1083 (1977).
61. Member Walther dissented in part. Id., 96 L.R.R.M. at 1087.
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sold, conveyed, or otherwise transferred or assigned to any successor without
first securing the agreement of the successor to assume the Employer's
61
obligations under this Agreement.
The Board found that the clause vitally affected the interests of the
bargaining unit employees. The Board noted that the general rules
governing successorship do not guarantee either wages orjobs,." and that a
successor's assumption of the predecessor's collective bargaining agree-
ment would therefore be "vital to the protection of [the bargaining unit]
employees' previously negotiated wages and working conditions . . . .
In the Board's view, the clause would "assure the survival of the fruits of
collective bargaining" and "would vitally affect the t;rms and conditions of
employment of the miners who survive such a change in ownership."'' 5
The Board also found in Lone Star that the successorship clause did
not come within the proscriptions of section 8(e) of the Act," and that the
union did not violate section 8(b)(4)(A) 7 by striking to compel the
employer to agree to the clause. The Board found that the transactions
contemplated by the successorship clause, namely, the sale or transfer of
the business entity, were not "doing business" within the meaning of the
"cease doing business with any other person" language of section 8(e).
The sale or transfer of a separate business entity, said the Board, is not
"doing business" within section 8(e), but rather is the substitution of one
entity for another while the conduct of the business itself continues without
interruption. Stated differently, upon the sale or transfer, the separate
62. Id..96 L.R.R.M. at 1085.
63. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972) held that i succesoremployer
is not bound by operation of law to the predecessor's labor contract, When a majority ol the
successor's workforce is comprised of the predecessor's employees. hossever. and sshen there is
substantial continuity in the employing or business enterprise, the successor may be obligated to
bargain with the predecessor union. Id. In particular situations the successor employer may also be
barred from making unilateral changes from the predecessor's employment terms, Spit/er Akron,
Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 20(1975). United Maintenance & Mfg. Co., 214 N.L.RB. 529(1974); Spruce Up
Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 194 (1974). See Machinists v. NLRB. 98 L.R.R.M, 2787 (D.C Cir,
1978). and cases there cited. The successor employer may further bt, required to arbitrate variou
matters arising under the predecessor's contract. Wiley and Sons. Inc. v. L ivingston. 376 lS, 543
(1964). See also Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees. 417 U.S. 249 (1974); Golden State Bottling
Co. v. NLRB. 414 U.S. 168 (1973). See generali Goldberg, The Labor Law Obl(:atlon% of a
Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 735 (1969); R. GORMAN; supra note 26. at 116-31. 575-83;
M orris & Gaus, Successorship and ihe Collective Bargaining Agreemie I: A c''ommtdatin!g Wiley and
Burns. 59 VA. L. REv. 1359 (1973).
64. 231N.L.R.B. No.88,96 L.R.R.M. at 1087.
65. Id.
66. Section 8(e) provides in part that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter
into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or rel rains
or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or othersm ise dealing in
any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person.
and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or heretfter containing such an
agreement shall be to such extent unenforceable and void ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).
67. Sections 8(b)(4)(i) and 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) make it an unfair labor p-actiee fora union to engage in
proscribed conduct such as strikes, threats or coercion to force an employer to enter into any agreement
prohibited by § 8(e). 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4)(i) & 158(b)(4)(ii)(A) (1970).
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business enterprise survives and continues despite the formal change in
ownership. The separate entities remain and continue in the same basic
employing industry without any disruption in the normal business rela-
tionships between the successor and the predecessor's suppliers and custo-
mers.
In concluding that the mine operation in Lone Star was a separate
entity that would probably continue in the event of a sale or transfer, thus
creating a substitution of business entities rather than a disruption of
normal business relationships, the Board noted that based upon past
experience it was likely that the mine employees would continue in their
jobs. That is, the separate cadre of employees indicated the separateness
of the business enterprise. The General Counsel distinguished Lone Star
on the ground that these elements of probable continuation were lacking in
the subsequent case under consideration. With regard to the successor-
ship clause in the later case the General Counsel stated that unlike Lone
Star.
The clause was not limited to applicability to situations where there are unit
employees who have survived a sale of the business. And, so far as the
evidence showed, there was no history of unit employees having survived a
sale of the business. We considered these facts significant. Had they been
different, arguably, the successorship clause might have been viewed as
protecting unit employees and, therefore, a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining.
The threshold difficulty with the General Counsel's rationale is that in
Lone Star the Board regarded the probable continuation elements as
relevant not to the section 8(b)(3) mandatory bargaining subject analysis
but rather to the section 8(b)(4) analysis. As noted above, the Board relied
upon those factors to buttress its finding that the situation involved a
substitution of separate business entities rather than a cease doing business
object proscribed by section 8(b)(4). The Board in no way indicated that
these factors were relevant to its finding that the successorship clause was a
mandatory subject of bargaining. On the contrary, the Board's decision in
Lone Star that the successorship clause was a mandatory subject of
bargaining was predicated squarely on the general proposition that a
successor's assumption of the predecessor's labor contract "would be vital
to the protection of [the predecessor] employees' previously negotiated
wages and working conditions ....,,9 The Board found that
the Union's insistence upon including in any agreement reached a provision
which would assure the survival of the fruits of collective bargaining, in the
event Lone Star thereafter should dispose of the Starlight mine, is not
violative of the Act, as agreement in this regard would vitally affect the terms
and conditions of employment of the miners who survive such a change in
ownership.' 0
68. NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep. [1978] L. ,. REL. RE'. (BNA) 61, 66-67.
69. 231 N.L.R.B. No. 88. 96 L.R.R.M. at 1087.
70. Id.
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The focal point of the Board's analysis was the legitimate interests of
the bargaining unit employees in seeking to protect their jobs and
employment conditions in the event of the sale of the business as a
continuing enterprise, not upon the likelihood of their being retained by a
successor in the event of such sale. The Board did not suggest that
successorship must first be found as a matter of law before the clause could
become operative.7t Indeed, in many situations the effect of the clause will
be to ensure the retention of the predecessor's employees by the successor,
obviously one of the primary purposes of the clause. 2 Compliance with
the clause could thus sometimes create a legal successorship, but the Board
did not say, as does the General Counsel, in effect, that legal successorship
is a prerequisite to the clause's validity. Indeed, the touchstone of the
Board's holding in Lone Star was its recognition of the fact that "the
general rules governing successorship guarantee neither employees' wages
nor theirjobs."73
To permit a union to try to secure through collective bargaining some
meaningful job protection in the event of sale or transfer is not inconsistent
with national labor policy concerning successorship. NLRB v. Burns• :, • g 74
International Security Services, Inc. held that a successor employer is not
71. The complex rules for the determination of successorship were succinctly summari/ed as
follows by the Board in Mondovi Foods Corp., 235 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 98 L.R.R.M, 1102. 1103 04
(1978) (footnotes omitted):
When all or part of a business is sold, certain legal obligations of the seller devolve upon
the purchaser. Where there is substantial continuity in the identity of the employing
enterprise, one such obligation will be that of the employer to reco lnie and bargain with a
union which represents the former owner's employees. However. if in the course of the
transfer, there have been substantial and material changes in the erploying enterprise, the
new employer will not be found to have succeeded to the bargaining obligation of the former
employer.
In cases involving the successorship issue, the Board's key consideration is "whether it
may reasonably be assumed that, as a result of transitional change!., the employees' desires
concerning unionization [have] likely changed." [citing Ranch-Way, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B,
1168, 1169(1970)]. The Board considers a variety of factors in determining whether the new
employer has succeeded to the former employer's bargaining obliga'ion. Certainly a prime
factor is whether the purchaser has hired a sufficient number of former employees of the seller
to constitute a majority of the employee complement of the appropriate unit, Once it has
been found that the purchaser has hired such a majority, the Board considers such
circumstances as whether or not there has been a long hiatus in resuming operations. Hiatus
is a significant factor because, as it lengthens, employees' expectations of hire by the
purchaser diminish. Change of location may have a similar result, in proportion to the
distance from the prior location. Changes in product line or market can be indicative o a
different type of business (e.g.. different or altered production riachinery necessitating
retraining and/or different skills). However, a change in scale of operation must be extreme
before it will alter a finding of successorship.
72. In NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc.. 406 U.S. 272, 294-95 (1972). the Court stated:
Although a successor employer is ordinarily free to set initial terms on which it will hire the
employees of a predecessor, there will be instances in which it is perfectly clear that the new
employer plans to retain all of the employees in the unit and in which it will be appropriate to
hase him initially consult with the employees' bargaining representative before he lixes
terms. In other situations, however, it may not be clear until the successor employer has
hired his full complement of employees that he has a duty to bargain with a union, since it will
not be evident until then that the bargaining representative repre,ents a majority of the
employees in the unit as required by § 9(a) of the Act.
73. 231 N.L.R.B.No.88,96L.R.R.M. at 1087.
74. 406 U.S. 272 (1972). See discussion at note 51 supra.
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bound by operation of law to the predecessor's labor contract. Burns does
not hold, however, that negotiated agreements limiting the conditions
under which the predecessor can sell are invalid. As the Board stated in
Lone Star:
[Burns] is inapposite here, however, inasmuch as it dealt with the question of
whether a successor's freedom was restricted by operation of law (i.e..
whether a successor was automatically bound to the terms of a preexisting
agreement), whereas the issue herein is whether voluntary restrictions upon
the freedom of the predecessor (the seller) may be insisted upon by a union.
We are not considering or passing upon the issues of whether a union may
lawfully act to compel compliance with such a provision or whether a
successor employer would be bound by the terms of such an agreement."
Both the literal language and rationale of Lone Star, as well as the
policy underlying the Board's decision, would seem to have precluded the
General Counsel's issuance of further complaints over the same class of
successorship clauses. Further litigation creates not only unnecessary
burdens and expenses for the parties but also general confusion and
uncertainty concerning the governing legal rules. It is beyond cavil that
the General Counsel has wide discretion concerning the issuance of
76
complaints, and that clarification of uncertain areas is a proper exercise
of that discretion. It just seems that no such need for clarification existed
here, and that the entire new exercise was not appropriate. One must
concede, however, that in light of such phenomena as the Bartlett-Collins
shift anything can happen, and the Board may well be prepared to apply a
heavier regulatory hand to the bargaining content as well as the mechanics.
There are aspects of the General Counsel's determination that are
more troublesome than the foregoing questions concerning the interpreta-
tion and application of specific precedent in a specific case. The radiations
from the General Counsel's approach again raise fundamental questions
about the NLRB's philosophy and conceptualization of the government's
role and function in the collective bargaining process.
One aspect is that the General Counsel found that the successorship
clause was not a mandatory subject of bargaining because the clause "was
not limited to applicability to situations where there are unit employees
who have survived a sale of the business. 7  The difficulty with this
approach is that the finding of a violation is predicated upon the failure of
the union to disclaim an illegitimate objective, rather than upon factual
evidence that the clause was used unlawfully. 78 The approach borders
75. 231 N.L.R.B. No.88n.13,96L.R.R.M. at 1087n.13.
76. See note 2 supra. Cf. Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers. Local 1184 v. Ordman. 318
F. Supp. 633. 636 (C. D. Cal. 1970) (federal court may review the General Counsel's determination of
a purely legal question, distinguishable from questions of administrative policy requiring the special
expertise of the General Counsel.").
77. NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1978] 98 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 61, 66-67.
78. See Local 60. Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651.653-56 (1961).
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upon or in fact embodies a virtual presumption of illegality. Indulgence in
such presumptions in the general area of legitimate labor-management
activity has been rejected by the Supreme Court. As the Court admon-
ished in Local357, Teamsters v. NLRB,7 9 the N LRB "cannot assume that a
union conducts its operations in violation of law .... " The Court
reemphasized the principle in NLRB v. News Syndicate Co. stating "we
will not assume that unions and employers will violate the federal
law . . . ." In News Syndicate the Court endorsed the Second Circuit's
ruling that "[i]n the absence of provisions calling explicitly for illegal
conduct, the contract cannot be held illegal because it failed affirmatively
to disclaim all illegal objectives." t  As stated by Justice Powell, "The
parties cannot agree to terms that violate the law, but the remedy that is
generally applied is post-execution invalidation and assessment of dam-
ages, rather than 'official compulsion over the actual terms of the
contract.' ,""2
Another troublesome aspect of the General Counsel's approach is
that, as with Bartlett-Collins, it again sounds in governmental overregula-
tion of the collective bargaining process. It is one thing to chart general
areas of mandatory, permissive, and illegal subjects of bargaining in order
to make the bargaining process viable. 3 This is clearly part of the N LR13's
proper function.14  It is a different matter, however, to engage in hyper-
technical categorizations of bargaining subjects that treat each new entry
into the bargaining field negatively and, in effect, with a presumption of
nonmandatoriness. This latter approach treats mandatory bargaining
subjects as some grudging exceptions to a collective bargaining philosophy
that discourages impasse situations resolvable by rhe economic strength
of the parties.85 Our national labor policy does not embody such a pristine
79. 365 U.S. 667.676(1961).
80. 365 U.S. 695, 699(1961).
81. NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 279 F.2d 323, 330 (2d Cir. 1960), afrl. 365 U.S. 695 (1961).
See also Paragon Prods. Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 662 (1961).
82. Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Pacific Maritime Comm'n. 98 - Ct, 927, 944 (1078) (Powell.
J., joined by Brennan & Marshall. J. J.. dissenting) (quoting H.K. Porter Co. v. N LRB 397 U,S, t(,
107-08 (1970)).
83. In NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 486 (1960) the Court noted:
"Obviously there is tension between the principle that the parties need not contract on any specific
terms and a practical enforcement of the principle that they are bound to deal % ith each other ill a
serious attempt to resolve differences and reach a common ground."
84. See general Cox & Dunlop. Regulation of Collective Bargaining bi, the National tabor
Relations Board. 63 HARv. L. REv. 389. 391-401 (1950).
85. As Professors Summers and Wellington have pointed out:
The determination that [a subject] is a mandatory subject of bargaining has two
consequences. First. the employer can not make unilateral changes without bargaining to
impasse. Second. the union can use economic force to influence his decision%, I he
boundaries of mandatory subjects of bargaining mark both the outer limits ol the legal dtlty
to discuss and the outer limits of the use of economic force, Neither the employer nor the
union can use economic force to compel agreement on a matter which is not a mandatory
subject of bargaining.
C. SUMMERS & H. WELLINGTON. CSES XND MATERIALS ON L NoR Lw 32 (1968).
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philosophy. On the contrary, the Supreme Court pointed out in NLRB r.
Insurance Agents' International Union"" that:
It must be realized that collective bargaining, under a system %%here the
Government does not attempt to control the results of negotiations. cannot
be equated with an academic collective search for truth or even with %%hat
might be thought to be the ideal of one. The parties even granting the
modification of views that may come from a realiation of economic
interdependence still proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic
viewpoints and concepts of self-interest. The system has not reached the
ideal of the philosophic notion that perfect understanding among people
would lead to perfect agreement among them on values. The presence of
economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the
parties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley
Acts have recognized. Abstract logical analysis might lind inconsistency
between the command of the statute to negotiate toward an agreement in
good faith and the legitimacy of the use of economic weapons. frequently
having the most serious effect upon individual workers and productihe
enterprises, to induce one party to come to the terms desired by the other.
But the truth of the matter is that at the present statutory stage of our
national labor relations policy, the two factors necessity for good-faith
bargaining between parties. and the availability of economic pressure de\ ices
to each to make the other party incline to agree on one's terms exist side by
side ....
...[T]he use of economic pressure by the parties to a labor dispute is
not a grudging exception to some policy of completely academic discussion
enjoined by the Act; it is part and parcel of the process of collective
bargaining.
A further troublesome aspect of this approach, which is in reality a
variation subsumed in the foregoing, is the degree to which the government
thereby intrudes upon the strong national labor policy in favor of the
fullest possible freedom of contract.87 The Supreme Court has repeatedly
affirmed the essential proposition that freedom of contract is a bedrock
principle embodied in the NLRA. In H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRBP the
Court stated that the "fundamental premise on which the Act is based" is
"private bargaining under governmental supervision of the procedure
alone, without any official compulsion over the actual terms of the
contract."89 In NLRB v. American National Insurance Co.90 the Court
86. 361 U.S. 477, 488-89, 495 (1960).
87. See generallt" Wellington. Freedom of Contract and the Colletive Bargainingj Agreement.
112 U. Ps. L. Ri. 467(1964). Professor Kathryn Sowle has noted that it isa"maxim in labor lasw that
the goernment should not interfere with the terms of dispute settlement" and that "this polic% ts
considered by both management and labor as vital to their relations." Comment. supra note48. at 2X6
& n.51.
88. 397 U.S. 99. 108(1970). "It is implicit in the entire structure of the Act that the Board act% to
oversee and referee the process of collective bargaining, leaving the results of the contest to the
bargaining strengths of the parties." Id. at 107-08.
89. "The Board's remedial powers under § 10 of the Act are broad, but the% are limited to
carrying out the policies of the Act itself. One of these fundamental policies is freedom of contract,"
Id. See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serss.. Inc.. 406 U.S. 272.282-87 (1972).
90. 343 U.S. 395.404(1952).
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stated that it was "clear that the Board may not, either directly or
indirectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the
substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements."9 1  In NLRB v.
Insurance Agents' International Union,92 the Court said: "Our labor policy
is not presently erected on a foundation of government control of the
results of negotiations." 93  And in Local 24, Teamsters v. Oliver94 the
Court stated: "Within the area in which collective bargaining was required,
Congress was not concerned with the substantive terms upon which the
parties agreed. . . .The purposes of the Acts are served by bringing the
parties together and establishing conditions under which they are to work
out their agreement themselves." 95
The General Counsel's modus vivendi reflected in this recent case
constitutes a substantial encroachment upon the contractual freedom of
the parties envisaged in the foregoing precepts. A question such as
whether or not a contract should contain a successorship clause is, in short,
"an issue for determination across the bargaining table, not by the
Board. 96 As Professor Cox cautioned some years ago, "The principles
determining legal rights and duties under a collective bargaining agree-
91. See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6 (1943):
The Railway Labor Act, like the National Labor Relations Act, does not undertake
governmental regulations of wages, hours, or working conditions, Instead it seeks to
provide a means by which agreement may be reached with respect to them. The national
interest expressed by those Acts is not primarily in the workingcon Jitions as such. Sofaras
the Act itself is concerned these conditions may be as bad as the employees will tolerate or be
made as good as they can bargain for. The Act does not fix and does n~t authorize anyone to
fix generally applicable standards for working conditions.
92. 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960).
93. The Court said further
[lit remains clear that § 8(d) was an attempt by Congress to prevent the Board from
controlling the settling of the terms of collective bargaining agreements ....
I .It is apparent from the legislative history of the whole Act that the policy of
Congress is to impose a mutual duty upon the parties to confer in good faith with a desire to
reach agreement, in the belief that such an approach from both sides of the table promotes the
overall design of achieving industrial peace. See Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlhi Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1. 45. Discussion conducted under that standard of good faith may narrow
the issues, making the real demands of the parties clearer to each other, and perhaps to
themselves, and may encourage an attitude of settlement through give and take, The
mainstream of cases before the Board and in the courts reviewing its orders, under the
provisions fixing the duty to bargain collectively, is concerned with (nsuring that the parties
approach the bargaining table with this attitude. But apart from this essential standard ol
conduct. Congress intended that the parties should have wide latitule in their negotiations.
unrestricted by any governmental power to regulate the substantive solution of their
differences.
Id. at 487-88.
94. 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959).
95. See Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB. 365 U.S. 667,676-77 (1961). "The theory of
the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited represenwtives of employees is likely to
promote industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and agret ments which the Act in itself
does not attempt to compel." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S, 1, 45 (1937),
96. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 409 (1952). See Local 357, Int'l Bhd, of
Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 676-77 (1961).
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ment should not be imposed from above; they should be drawn out of the
institutions of labor relations and shaped to their needs." 97
The Board's recent decision in Elizabethtown Water Co.98 stands in
sharp contrast to the General Counsel's restrictive approach toward
identification of mandatory subjects of bargaining. The case, as with the
Board's decisions in Axelson and Lone Star and of course unlike its
decision in Bartlett-Collins, reflects an expansive Board philosophy that
envisages bargaining resolution by the parties of the widest possible range
of matters related to the employer-employee relationship. The philo-
sophy favors inclusion rather than exclusion of matters from mandatory
bargaining.
In Elizabethtown Water Co. the Board found that the employer
violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the
union concerning a retirement plan that had expired during the life of the
parties' collective bargaining agreement. The most recent agreement
between the parties was effective from February 1, 1976 until January 31.
1978. The agreement specifically provided for and incorporated a retire-
ment plan9 9 and provided that the plan "shall not be subject to change prior
to February 1, 1977.'00 The union submitted no demands concerning the
retirement plan during the negotiations for the current agreement, nor did
the parties discuss whether or not plan and contract negotiations should
occur simultaneously in the future. Further, the union submitted no
demand that the employer agree to bargain during the contract term. On
September 21, 1976, and at various times thereafter, continuing until April
1977, the union requested that the employer bargain regarding the plan.
The employer refused, contending that it was not obligated to bargain
about any contract provision, including the plan, until expiration of the
contract. The employer further contended that the union had waived its
right to bargain about the plan during the contract term by failing during
negotiations to request a change in the 1977 plan reopener provisions of
Article XXV. The Board rejected the employer's contentions and held
that the employer's refusal to bargain was unlawful.
97. Cox, Rights Under A Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REv. 601, 605 (1956).
98. 234 N.L.R.B. No. 68, 97 L.R.R.M. 1488 (1978).
99. Article XXV of the agreement provided:
Employees will be granted retirement benefits in accordance with a formal retirement plan
known as the -Employee's Retirement Plan of Elitabethto%%n Water Company" dated
September 1. 1965 (as revised through February I. 1973) as described in a separate booklet
which will be given to each employee. The provisions of said plan. as resised through
February I. 1973. shall not be subject to change prior to February I. 1977.
Id.. 97 L.R.R.M. at 1488-89.
100. I. Prior to 1973 the expiration dates of the agreement and plan were coterminous in
various agreements between the parties. During negotiations for the 1973 contract the parties agreed
on the language of Article XXV, supra note 99, before reaching agreement on the contract's
duration. The parties thereafter agreed on a one-year contract. effectise from February I. 1973 until
January 31. 1974. The durational terms of the contract and plan thus became different. The
succeeding contract was effective from February I. 1974 until January 31. 1976. w~ith the expiration
date of the plan thus one year later.
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The Board found that the retirement plan was a mandatory subject of
bargaining"" and that "[a]n employer must bargain (luring the existence of
a bargaining agreement in regard to a mandatory subject of bargaining not
specifically covered by the contract or unequivocally waived by the union,
regardless of whether the contract contains a reopener clause."""' The
Board found that while Article XXV of the agreement provided that the
plan would remain in effect for a specified term (until 1977), the agreement
did not expressly or impliedly forbid negotiations during that term.""
The Board noted that the contract did not reflect any understanding
between the parties whether or not, or on what terms, the plan would be
continued beyond February 1, 1977, and that the parties did not discuss
any matters concerning the plan during negotiations. The Board noted
further that it would have been premature for the parties to have bargained
about the plan during the 1976 negotiations because the parties had
previously agreed not to change the plan until 1977.
The Board found further that the union had not waived its right to
bargain about the plan during the life of the contract. The Board said that
failure to raise the issue during negotiations did not constitute a waiver of
the right to bargain over a mandatory subject because waiver requires a
conscious relinquishment, clearly intended and expressed . 4  The Board
found no such clear relinquishment by the union concerning the plan. 05
As a technical matter, the Board's decision appears to be inconsistent
with the provisions of section 8(d) that purport to relieve a party from
midterm bargaining concerning matters contained in the contract. Sec-
tion 8(d) provides that:
[Tihe duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to
discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in
a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become effective before
101. A retirement plan is considered a term or condition of employment within the meaning o
§ 8(d). See Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB. 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948). 'cert, dnie. 336 U'S, 961(1949).
102. 234 N.L.R.B. No. 68.97 L.R.R.M. at 1489.
103. The Board distinguished Nevada Cement Co.. 181 N.L.R.I3 738 (1970), as a situation in
which the contract forbids alterations, modifications or termination during the contract term.
104. Determination of whether or not a party has %%aied its right to bargain by cxprcss
agreement (e.g.. a "Aipper" clause), bargaining history, or inaction is a complex tlUcstion. Pg . N 1 Ru
V. Auto Crane Co. 536 F.2d 310 (10th Cir. 1976): Medicenter. Mcd-South Flosp., 221 NI .R, 670
(1975): Radioear Corp.. 214 N.L.R.B. 362 (1974). 1tq,'mhzlg. 199 NI R,B. 1161 (1972), 1ipI
Corp.. 190 N.L.R.B. 240 (1971): New York Mirror. 151 N.I .R.B, 334 (1965). Ador Corp-. 150
N.L.R.B. 1658 (1965); C & C Plywood Corp.. 148 N.L.R.B. 414 (1964). e'nforcenwnt denied, 351 F,2d
224(9th Cir. 1965). ret'd & remanded, 385 U.S. 421(1967): Perkins Mach. Co,. 141 N.L.R.B. 98 (1963),
See generall, R. GORMAN, supra note 26. at 466-80.
105. The Board stated:
Although ... the history of collecti%e bargaining between the parties did not include midterm
bargaining, the Union was not thereby obligated to request in 1976.a provision u hiet wotld allow
bargaining concerning the Plan in 1977. Rather. since neither -arty sought to bargain with
respect to providing a mechanism %hereb% bargaining could occur when the Plan became subject
to change, and since the Agreement does not rellect an% understanding on the provision, under
which a retirement plan may operate after Februar% I. 1977. u-, find that the Union did not clearly
relinquish and thereby waive its statutory right to bargain about th. Plan,
234 N.L.R.B. No. 68.97 L.R.R.M. at 1490.
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such terms and conditions can be reopened under the pro isions ol the
contract.1
0 6
Interpreting this provision in Jacobs Manufacturing Co., 10' the Board es-
tablished the principles that parties need not engage in midterm bargain-
ing regarding matters contained in the contract, but that absent wvaiver
they must bargain regarding matters neither contained in the contract nor
discussed in negotiations.""
Once it was determined, as the Board seems to have done here. that
the plan was incorporated into and part of the contract, then Jacohi %% ould
appear to dictate that the employer was not obligated to bargain about the
plan during the life of the contract. Conversely, if the Board had found
that the plan was neither contained in the contract nor discussed during
negotiations, then Jacobs would seem to dictate that the employer %%as
required to bargain about the plan.109
The Board applied neither of the foregoing analyses, however, but
rather blended both sides of the Jacobs doctrine into a broad, albeit
confusing, holding"0 that again reflects a philosophy that only the clearest
and strongest considerations will remove a matter from the bargaining
table. For the Board concluded that while the plan was contained in the
contract the employer nevertheless was obligated to engage in midterm
bargaining because the contract did not expressly or impliedly forbid such
bargaining. Resolution of midtem bargaining obligations under Jacobso
turns essentially upon whether or not the particular matter is contained in
the contract. The element of containment becomes the touchstone for
resolution of the underlying question of whether or not the parties
106. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (Supp. V 1975).
107. 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951). enforced. 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952), See \I RB %, \il s-
Bement-Pond Co.. 199 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1952); Proctor Mfg. Corp.. 131 N.L.R.B. 1166 (1961).
108. For exploration of the various considerations entailed in Jacobs-type situations. see Cox &
Dunlop. supra note 84. at 391-401: Cox & Dunlop. 77e Dutrio Bargain Collet tlveh Dtring the Ternn
of an Exi.sting Agreement. 63 H %Rv. L. RE\'. 1097(1950): Findling& Colby. Retulatin of G dh'tie
Bargaining br the National Labor Relations Board-Another View. 51 CoLrt . L. RE%. 170 (1951).
See also W\ollett. 77e Dtny to Bargain Over the "I'm i-written" Terni and Coution% o/ Fniplo intent. 36
TEXAS L. REV. 863 (1958). Concerning the interrelationship of strikes over midterm bargaining for
contract modification of termination and notice requirements of § 8(d). see NLRB . Lion Oil Co..
352 U.S. 283 (1957): Local 9735, UMW v. NLRB. 258 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Scealso Mastro
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB. 350 U.S. 270 (1956); NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp.. 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.
1957). cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958).
109. If the matter im olh es a permissive rather than a mandator% subiect of bargaining not onl-
are the parties not obligated to engage in midterm or other bargaining, but also unilateral midterm
modification of the permissive term is not %iolatie of§8(d). Chemical Worker I ocal I%,Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co.. 404 U.S. 157. 183-88 (197 1).
110. The situation confronting the parties appeared to be noel to their relationship and ma)
xsell hase posed potentially serious problems concerning the status of the plan for the duration ol the
contract. The Board did not. ho\%e% er. approach the case as nigenero , T hus. ior eample. the Botard
did not limit its holding to that of a no\ el situation beyond the contemplation or pretimed intent of the
parties, nor to a situation %%arranting equitable relief for a mutual mistake. Rather. uithout disucuston
or een citation of Jacobs the Board found that a part\ must engage in midterm bargaining oser a
contained term because the contract did not expressly forbid such bargaining, 234 \ 1 1R,1, \o 6S.
97 L.R.R.M. at 1489-90.
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intended to settle the particular matter for the life of the contract.
Imposing an added requirement that the contract specifically forbid
bargaining about the particular matter adds a whol2 new dimension to the
Jacobs analysis and clearly favors resolution of matters by collective
bargaining rather than by default or governmental flat under hypertechni-
cal rules.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis suggests slight movements by the NLRB
toward increased governmental regulation of the collective bargaining
process. The movements may, in Mr. Justice Holmes' words, be intersti-
tial and "confined from molar to molecular motions."' " Or a wind may be
rising, in which event we may wish to know our direction.
II I. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205. 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting),
